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Abstract More and more educators and researchers use ICT-tools to support collabo-
rative learning. Research has shown that, for collaborative learning to be more effective
than individual learning, individual learners have to achieve a sufficiently common cog-
nitive frame of reference, or common ground. This common ground does not appear by
itself, but rather often needs to be negotiated. This negotiation is seen as an important
aspect of collaborative learning. This article presents a study with NTool, an ICT-tool to
support the negotiation of common ground. NTool supports learners in making their
individual perspectives explicit to others so that common ground can be negotiated. Two
versions of the tool differing in the extent to which users were coerced into adhering to
embedded support principles were used in a secondary vocational education setting.
Coercion, as expected, increased negotiation of common ground in both settings. However,
results were contradictory with regard to the extent to which common ground was
achieved. Overall, it can be concluded that NTool and its underlying framework affect
negotiation of common ground, and that adding some coercion increases this effect.
However, when learners have no prior experience in collaborative complex problem-
solving, NTool may only affect surface aspects of communication.
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Support of grounding in the classroom
More and more educators and researchers use ICT-tools to support a great variety of
collaborative learning tasks (Jonassen 2000; Norman 1993). In particular, the support of
complex problem-solving has received much attention from researchers and developers in
the field of ICT. Specific ICT-tools have been designed to support problem-solving
activities such as group design (Buckingham Shum et al. 1997), scientific reasoning
(Suthers 2001), and computer modelling (Lo¨hner et al. 2003). As such they all address
aspects of the structure of complex problems, often based on a problem’s ontology.
Buckingham Shum et al., for example, set out from the notion that any design problem can
be structured in terms of design questions, options for answering the questions, and criteria
that have to be fulfilled in order for the options to provide an answer to the questions (i.e.,
the QOC approach to group design).
As complex problem-solving typically is a collaborative activity, the above methods
face two problems. First, they all are predicated on the combination of knowledge sharing
and knowledge integration. However, research has shown that individual learners have to
engage each other’s thinking in order for collaborative learning to be more effective than
individual learning (Barron 2003). This means that learners need to achieve a common
cognitive frame of reference, or common ground (Bromme 2000; Clark and Brennan
1991), to reap the benefits of having multiple problem perspectives within a learning
group. While the tools mentioned offer support for coping with complexity in terms of
specific problem structure, they do not offer complementary support for the negotiation of
common ground. In other words, none of the tools mentioned address the structure of the
groups that solve these complex problems, and specifically the common ground they need
for problem-solving.
Various researchers have pointed out the importance for common ground for collabo-
rative learning. According to Baker et al. (1999), any task that demands a collaborative
effort will also demand that learners negotiate a shared task representation. In the context
of complex problem-solving, this would mean that they have to negotiate a shared problem
definition in order to successfully solve the problem. The present article presents NTool, an
ICT-tool that addresses the group aspect of multiple perspectives by facilitating the
negotiation of common ground. NTool is an online communication tool (see Fig. 1 for an
impression) with embedded support of grounding processes (‘‘grounding processes’’ and
‘‘negotiation of common ground’’ are used synonymously in this article).
Although many ICT-tools indirectly affect grounding processes, as an effect of using
external representations for group support, NTool aims to facilitate the collaboration by
directly influencing the grounding process. It does so by making users externalise their
private understanding of others’ contributions. The word ‘‘private’’ is used because such
individual understanding can remain un-externalised, in which case the contributor has no
way to find out what the other understood. Externalising one’s private understanding is
important for the negotiation process. Facilitating the grounding process will in turn
increase the extent to which learning groups establish common ground.
Like other ICT-tools, NTool uses specific communication rules (a formalism) and
constraints (coercion) to attain this facilitation. Communication rules are rules that
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prescribe a certain communication procedure. An example of a communication rule
would be: ‘‘If someone introduces a new topic, all conversation partners are required to
explicitly verify whether they understood what was meant.’’ Coercion is a means of
making participants adhere to a formalism so as to increase its effectiveness. In the case
of the above example rule, applying low coercion might be that discussion partners are
informed about the rule, but can decide for themselves whether or not they follow it. An
example of high coercion would be that a chair-person would not allow new topics to
be put on the table before the rule was followed (i.e., understanding was explicitly
verified).
The goal of the present study is twofold. The first goal is to replicate the results of an
earlier study (see Beers et al. 2005). The main differences with the earlier study, which are
discussed in detail in the next section, is that this study is performed in a more ecologically
valid setting, and some social aspects of the group are measured, so as to gain an
impression of how robust the positive results of the original study are when NTool is tried
in a more demanding setting. The second goal is to control for possible unintended effects
of NTool by measuring additional variables (also see the next section). In this study,
cognitive load is used as a check for possible cognitive overloading, and the perceived
social affordances of NTool and group psychological safety are used to increase explan-
atory power in case of unexpected results and control for confounding due to social
differences between groups.
We first discuss the previous study by Beers et al. (2005), the shortcomings it had in
terms of measured variables and ecological validity, and how we dealt with that in the
present study. We then describe our perspective on the relation between collaborative
learning and negotiation of common ground, after which we present our theoretical
framework.
Fig. 1 An impression of NTool, with pictures of the message types (lower left-hand), the discussion
window (lower right-hand), and the chat window (upper right-hand), with a snapshot of discussion (in
Dutch)
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Earlier research with NTool
In a prior study, Beers et al. (2005) explored the influence of different levels of coercion
(low, medium and high coercion conditions) on the effectiveness of NTool in terms of the
negotiation of common ground and the extent to which common ground itself was
established. Participants were students of business sciences, psychology, or cultural sci-
ences university seniors who were divided into multidisciplinary groups of three. Each
group was assigned a collaborative problem-solving task to be carried out using NTool. Six
groups were in the low-coercion condition, five were in the medium coercion condition,
and six were in the high-coercion condition. NTool’s influence on both the grounding
process and the extent to which common ground was achieved was shown to increase with
increasing level of coercion. There was a significant correlation between level of coercion
and negotiation of common ground, rs(N = 17) = .51, P < .05; the higher the level of
coercion (i.e., the fewer degrees of freedom that the participants had to operate and thus
had to adhere to the formalism), the greater the effects of NTool were on the negotiation of
common ground. However, the results also showed that the medium coercion groups
required significantly more regulation behaviour than the other groups, U(N = 17) = 4.00,
P < .01. This result was unexpected and its causes were unknown, partially due to the
inclusion of only measures of expected outcomes. Furthermore, being a typical laboratory
study, it had limited ecological validity.
The study presented here is a partial replication of that, but with additional measures
and increased ecological validity. With regard to the additional measures, research has
shown that achieving common ground is also influenced by social factors. For instance,
while designers of ICT-tools typically facilitate task content communication, they may be
limited in the extent to which they afford (see Norman 1993) social communication aspects
(Kreijns et al. 2002). The question then arises as to whether such ICT-tools have sufficient
social affordances to allow for a good team atmosphere to emerge. Social affordances are
particularly important in the case in hand, as research has also shown that social beliefs
such as team psychological safety can influence grounding processes (Van den Bossche
et al. 2004). It is not surprising, then, to assume that the social affordances of NTool might
influence grounding processes. This article, therefore, includes measures of social affor-
dances for NTool and of psychological safety as a measure of team social beliefs.
Also, the medium coercion condition in the prior study needed disproportionately more
regulation than the low and high coercion versions. For instance, participants would ask
each other about why NTool would not allow them to post the message they intended to
post, or they would need to explain to each other what steps they were to take to keep the
discussion going. This may indicate that the participants experienced difficulties using this
version of the tool that were not experienced by participants using the other versions. This
could indicate some disruption of communication processes because the communication
was constrained to the extent that participants had trouble carrying out their task (Dillen-
bourg 2002). Indeed, sometimes aspects of ICT-tools may lead to cognitive overloading, in
which case they can even have negative influences on group learning processes and out-
comes (Van Bruggen et al. 2002). However, no quantitative measurements were included in
the earlier study to substantiate this explanation. Measures of cognitive load were, thus,
included in the present study to rule out the possibility that the combination of NTool and
the learning tasks cause too much cognitive load to properly carry out the task itself.
With regard to differences in ecological validity, the 2005 study was a laboratory study
in which 17 groups of three students carried out a collaborative learning task. For each
group, members were chosen so that they did not know each other in advance, so as
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minimise differences between groups with regard to social climate. The study was con-
ducted under highly regulated circumstances with highly motivated participants, so that
influences of social processes on the effectiveness of NTool could be assumed to be small.
Furthermore, the collaborative task to be carried out—solving the problem of high-school
drop-out—was chosen on the basis of prior experiences with the same task (Van Bruggen
2003). Though a current and relevant problem in general, it was not very realistic in the
sense that the participants would not have received such a task as part of their normal
education. In contrast, the task used in the present study served as both pilot for a new, and
thus real, multidisciplinary learning task in a secondary vocational education institute as
well as an experimental task. The study involved a problem-solving task for multidisci-
plinary groups of three, carried out in a computer lab in the vocational secondary school
with approximately 30 participants at once. This setting was identical to a real class setting
used for some of the participants education and the task was constructed in collaboration
with teachers from each of the disciplines present in the student groups.
Collaborative learning and common ground
We distinguish two ways in which negotiation of learning is related to collaborative
learning. First, negotiation of common ground can be seen as being part of any collabo-
rative learning process in which groups collaboratively negotiate the meaning of some
learning content. This point closely follows the argument made by Baker et al. (1999) who
defined a collaboration task as an effort that results from a shared (read: grounded) problem
definition, after which it follows that collaborative learning involves grounding by defi-
nition. In other words, any collaborative task requires some common ground to begin with,
and continued attention to maintain common ground after that. Learning about how to
negotiate common ground can help learners avoid the more common pitfalls in negotiation
processes that can undermine collaboration tasks. For instance, research has shown that
learning groups will generally concentrate on that knowledge the group knows it shares
(i.e., knowledge that has already become part of a group’s common ground), instead of
unshared knowledge (Fischer and Mandl 2005). Similarly, Bromme et al. (2001) found that
people overestimate the extent to which their own disciplinary knowledge is known by
others. Furthermore, their research even suggested that it is up to the collaborator with the
least understanding of another’s field to monitor the common ground itself. These findings
suggest that the negotiation of common ground is a difficult process with some pitfalls
easily trodden into. Instructing learners how to negotiate common ground may be able to
help them learn how to collaborate.
While the first way posits the negotiation process as a prerequisite for collaborative
learning, the second, complementary way sees the negotiation process and the learning
process as largely overlapping. In this case, it concerns specific tasks that benefit greatly
when done in a co-ordinated effort instead of individually. What learning tasks are we
talking about? First, they must be group tasks in the sense that they can not be carried out
individually (Cohen 1994). Second, they should concern ill-structured problems, meaning
that there is no clear problem-solving path, nor one right answer, typically require con-
certed group efforts (Cohen). Such tasks involve exchanging ideas, hypotheses and
speculations. Making sure that the group as a whole constructs from this exchange a set of
mutually shared ideas, hypotheses and speculations can itself be seen as a grounding
process, for it means that the group needs to negotiate the meaning of a set of topics that
most or all group members are only partially familiar. For instance, in cases such as
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problem-based learning (Barrows and Tamblyn 1980) where learners study the same topic,
but may use widely different sources of information. Grounding is important here because
learners need to verify and clarify those differences that arise from studying different
sources on the same matter. In this case, learners arrive in groups with incomplete
knowledge, and learn from each other by exchanging information and grounding it.
Conversely, negotiation of common ground is of lesser importance for learning tasks where
individual differences in knowledge and understanding play a small role, such as in class-
based mathematics education. On the whole, one might say that grounding is important for
any learning task with an important collaborative aspect.
Negotiation of common ground
Theory on negotiation of common ground originated in linguistics (Clark and Schaefer
1989). Bromme adapted the theory to the field of cognitivism in his writings on cognitive
interdisciplinarity (Bromme 2000). The linguistic approach describes how negotiation of
common ground appears in conversation. It emphasises the process as it can be observed
from communication, and describes how people can contribute to communication, in order
to add to a group’s common ground. Although Clark and Schaefer do mention some
individual influences on grounding (‘‘prior beliefs, assumptions, and other information’’,
p. 260), their writings focus on the conversational mechanisms. In contrast, the cognitivist
approach focuses on the way new knowledge is processed, the role that prior knowledge
plays in this process, and how individual perspectives affect this. Specifically, it describes
how mutual perspectives (assumptions of prior knowledge of the other, and whether one’s
own knowledge is shared with the other) influence what people will contribute in con-
versation. In other words, the linguistic approach focuses on surface characteristics of
communication and the cognitivist approach addresses the underlying cognitive influences.
In that sense, the two theories can be seen as largely complementary. The combination of
the two links the content of a learning process to the way it is communicated between
people.
The following exemplifies how both theories can be combined; Clark and Schaefer
(1989) write that people will assume that the content of an utterance is part of common
ground unless there is evidence to the contrary. Bromme et al. (2001) found that people
overestimate the extent to which their own knowledge is known by others, and that they
make their contributions partly based on their assumptions of the other’s prior knowledge.
It would follow that many contributions will require subsequent clarification before their
content is sufficiently understood in the same way by all conversation partners.
This article combines linguistic (Clark and Brennan 1991) and cognitive (Bromme
2000) approaches to the negotiation of common ground. In this conceptualisation, the
grounding process starts when team members contribute their, as yet, unshared knowledge,
so that others can try to apprehend that knowledge. At this point, a number of biases come
into play that cause differences between the intended meaning of a contribution, and the
contribution as it is understood. While constructing their own individual understanding, the
other team members use their knowledge of aspects like the contributor’s background and
views held, and the current situation, to better ‘‘understand’’ the contribution. Also, their
own beliefs and assumptions play a role while trying to understand a contribution. A
contribution is thus always understood against the presumed perspective of the other and
one’s own perspective (Bromme 2000). Therefore, having shared a contribution with a
team does not necessarily mean that the team members all have acquired the same
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understanding. Instead, it is often the case that different people will have dissimilar rep-
resentations of the content and meaning of the contribution, about the objects, people,
interactions or situations the contribution discusses (Boshuizen and Tabachnek-Schijf
1998). People can have different representations as a result from interpreting a contribution
only in their own perspective or from minimising or rejecting its validity or plausibility due
to differences in conviction or opinion. Also, presented with the same information, dif-
ferent people may still come to different conclusions. The negotiation of common ground
then is the iterative minimisation of these representational differences, through providing
feedback based on one’s own perspective by word or action (Alpay et al. 1998; Baker et al.
1999).
In the present article, negotiation of common ground is conceived of as a dual concept.
The first aspect is negotiation of meaning which leads to agreement regarding meaning and
understanding of a contribution. This entails making one’s as yet unshared understanding
of some contribution public to others, who in turn verify whether and to what extent their
own understanding of the contribution is the same or different from what others intended,
receiving feedback on this (clarification), re-verifying, and so on, until ‘‘the contributor
and the partners mutually believe that the partners have understood what the contributor
meant to a criterion sufficient for the current purpose’’ (Clark and Schaefer 1989, p. 262,
the grounding criterion). Negotiation of position, the second aspect, concerns people
making public to others their private opinion about a contribution, checking whether one’s
position is clear to others, and vice versa.
The above description of the grounding process is the basis for the design of the NTool
formalism to support negotiation of common ground. The formalism consists of negotia-
tion primitives, basic building blocks that constitute a specific dialogue model (Dillenbourg
2002), and rules that prescribe the use of these primitives. Table 1 summarises these rules.
Together these rules and primitives mimic the negotiation process as explicitly as possible.
Note that this formalism models an ideal negotiation process; in regular communication,
the status of people’s statements in terms of negotiation primitives often remains implicit.
The formalism must enable the user to more easily distinguish between original contri-
butions, clarifications, verifications, et cetera, thus making the negotiation process more
explicit. This way, individual differences in understanding and opinion between users
should more easily surface.
Negotiation starts with a contribution (Primitive 1) such as a hypothesis or a position,
which is assumed not to be part of a team’s common ground (Rule 1). To detect differences
between individual representations, team members must verify (Primitive 2) their under-
standing of the contribution (Rule 2) because people articulate and understand a contri-
bution against their own background knowledge (Fischer et al. 1995). Third, a contribution
needs to be elucidated (clarification, Primitive 3), using the ideas upon which it was based.
For example, the educational background or the political orientation of the contributor may
shed light on the meaning of a contribution. A clarification need not always be made by the
Table 1 Rules for the NTool support principle
1. Every new issue is termed a contribution
2. Contributions require a verification by the other team members
3. Each verification is responded to with clarification by the original contributor
4. When all verifications are clarified, and no new verifications are performed, all team members state
whether they accept or reject the statement
5. All team members state their position about accepted statements
Note. Primitives in italics
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original contributor, but may also be performed by another team member who feels
knowledgeable or that (s)he understands the contribution. Rule 3 is that all verifications
require a clarification. Together, Rules 2 and 3 can be iterated until common understanding
of the contribution is reached.
The fourth primitive is acceptance/rejection of a contribution, whether one can judge a
contribution as true (acceptance), or untrue or unintelligible (rejection), based on the
explanation given and one’s own prior knowledge. For example, the statement 1 + 1 = 10,
is true only if we understand (through Rules 1 and 2) that the contributor is using the binary
system. A contribution should be accepted as part of the common ground if it is true, or
after it has been modified so that it has become true. Rule 4 is that every contribution needs
to be accepted or rejected by the team members. Finally, Rule 5 is that people must
explicitly state their own position (position, Primitive 5) on the contribution. In the case of
irresolvable disagreement about previously accepted statements, Rule 5 may result in
multiple scenarios, each based on another position (i.e., agree to disagree). This means that
one may accept a certain contribution, but disagree all the same, for example when neither
person can prove the other wrong. In such cases, people can agree to disagree, and alternate
representations that are equally legitimate can ensue.
Note that the work by both Clark and Schaefer (1989) and Bromme (2000) is
descriptive, describing how the actual grounding process unfolds. In contrast the above
formalism has a very prescriptive nature. Also note that the formalism is particularly task-
oriented, that is, it aims to facilitate grounding activities related to the task at hand and its
informational content, and disregards other grounding activities. In that sense, the for-
malism theoretically departs from both Clark and Schaefer and Bromme.
Conceptually, there is little difference between common ground as we use it here and
knowledge convergence as it has been used by Fischer and Mandl (2005). The latter
concept, however, focussed not only on knowledge that is shared, but also on shared use of
that knowledge, or, in other words, the same learning outcomes across collaborating
learners. Conversely, our use of the concept of common ground allows different learning
outcomes, it only requires the outcomes reported by one group member to be known by the
other group members to be common ground. Learners in collaborating groups may well
disagree on certain aspects of a collaborating task. They would still be on common ground
if they at least know of their respective different opinions, but they would not portray
knowledge convergence.
The negotiation tool
NTool is based on a newsgroup reader for asynchronous, distributed, text-based discus-
sions. To optimise NTool for negotiation of multiple representations, the formalism was
implemented to structure the negotiation process in two ways with different levels of
coercion (cf. Dillenbourg 2002).
Coercion, a form of scripting, is defined as the degree of freedom participants have in
following a formalism. Coercion and formalism together constitute a collaboration script.
The higher the coerciveness of a script, the more the participants are required to adhere to
the formalism. Scripting requires ‘‘subjects on most or all occasions to make a particular
type of speech act in a specific context’’ (Baker and Lund 1997, p. 176). A script that uses
very little coercion leaves participants many degrees of freedom such that usage of the
formalism attains a high degree of idiosyncrasy. A script with a high level of coercion
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constrains the number of options participants have, thus guiding them along the lines of the
formalism (Weinberger et al. 2005).
In the present study, two different ICT-implementations of the formalism were em-
ployed (see Methods). One implementation had very little coercion; although it did offer
the various message types as support, participants could use them as they liked. The other
implementation used scripts aimed at interaction and collaboration (high coercion) and so
applied strict rules to when and in what situation a message type could be used. In each
implementation, coercion was aimed at the verification and clarification primitives, that is,
the extent to which people were required to verify and clarify contributions in specific
circumstances.
Social influences and unintended effects
In addition to measuring the intended outcomes of NTool (increased negotiation and
common ground with increased coercion), we aimed to control for the influence of social
variables on grounding processes, and we wanted to rule out unexpected social and cog-
nitive effects.
With regard to social influences on grounding, research has shown that several team
beliefs may have an important influence on the grounding process (Van den Bossche et al.
2004). In this study, we focus on one such factor, psychological safety, defined by
Edmondson (1999) as ‘‘a shared belief held by members of a team that the team is safe for
interpersonal risk taking’’ (p. 350). Her studies show that psychological safety affects team
performance by augmenting a number of team learning behaviours, some of which are
seeking feedback and sharing information. Conversely, she found that a lack of psycho-
logical safety made team members reluctant to ask feedback or question team goals, out of
fear for sanctions. Among the important mechanisms, Edmondson found that psycholog-
ical safety makes it easier for people to build on each other, to voice disagreements, and to
ask feedback. Van den Bossche et al. (2004) reported similar results for the influence of
psychological safety. Their results showed that psychological safety facilitates the nego-
tiation of mutually shared cognition, which in turn leads to increased perceived team
effectiveness. The above results suggest that psychological safety might be able to facil-
itate making a verification and voicing one’s opinion, because learners have more trust that
this will not lead to repercussions from their team partners. Therefore, in the present study
psychological safety is treated as an important covariate for the effect of NTool on
negotiation. Psychological safety is expected to have a positive influence on the negotia-
tion of common ground.
With regard to ruling out unintended social and cognitive affects of NTool, it is
important to first understand how coercion may adversely affect collaboration. Dillenbourg
(2002) argues that there are trade-offs between coercion and team processes. On the one
hand, increasing coercion may increase the effectiveness of the formalism in question.
However, too much coercion may disturb interactions (disruption of communication,
Dillenbourg 2002; also see Cohen 1994). An example is the aforementioned study by Beers
et al. (2005), in which one specific version of NTool resulted in a disproportionately large
number of regulative utterances. This might indicate two things: the additional need for
regulation (1) shifts attention away from social processes and therefore negatively affects
social aspects of NTool; and it (2) is an additional demand on working memory processes
which may cause cognitive overload. Furthermore, the extent of coercion needs to be
geared toward the learners’ capacities. The less coercion, the more learners need to fulfil
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the prerequisites needed to execute the learning processes as facilitated (Cohen 1994). In
this study we measured social aspects of NTool to explore whether low and high coercion
versions of NTool differed with respect to the extent in which they afforded social pro-
cesses, and we measured cognitive load to be able to detect significant differences in
working memory load.
With regard to social aspects of NTool, we used work by Kreijns (2004) on social
presence and sociability in ICT-learning environments. Note here that social presence and
sociability are aspects of the ICT-environment, whereas psychological safety is an aspect
of teams. Social presence is defined as ‘‘the ability of learners to project themselves
socially and emotionally’’ in a learning environment (Rourke et al. 1999), and is thought to
support critical thinking processes in learning groups (Garrison et al. 2000). In the case of
NTool, social presence is thus dependent on the extent to which NTool affords participants
in conveying social and emotional messages. Social presence is closely related to socia-
bility, defined by Kreijns as ‘‘the extent to which the CSCL environment is able to
facilitate the emergence of a social space’’ (p. 7), that is, a ‘‘human network of social
relationships between group members’’ (p. 7). In the present study, both sociability and
social presence are measured.
With regard to cognitive load effects, we build on the work of Van Bruggen et al. (2002)
on the effects of external representations on cognitive load. Van Bruggen et al. (2002)
found that poorly designed instruction for knowledge externalisation may increase cog-
nitive load, due to the effort needed to apply the instruction in action. In the case of NTool,
this effect conceivably could be caused by too much coercion. Cognitive load theory (Paas
et al. 2004; Sweller et al. 1998) distinguishes between germane cognitive load, which is
caused by working memory processes that lead to schema construction and automation,
and extraneous load, which is ‘‘imposed by the manner in which the information is
presented to learners and by the learning activities required of learners’’ (Paas et al. 2004,
p. 2). Extraneous load can thus be caused by understanding the instruction aimed at
generating germane processes. Because of working memory limitations, it is important that
extraneous load is minimised, and that total load does not exceed working memory lim-
itations (Sweller et al. 1998). With regard to NTool, this means that high coercion could
lead to increased extraneous cognitive load, because high coercion requires the participants
to allot working memory resources to understanding the way coercion is implemented, but
also to increased germane cognitive load, due to increased working memory allotted to
verifying and clarifying contributions. The present study compares cognitive load mea-
surements with differences in negotiation and common ground between Stringent and
Idiosyncratic versions of NTool to study germane and extraneous cognitive load effects of
coercion.
Hypotheses
NTool was expected to increase the negotiation of common ground because it forced team
members to make their private understandings and opinions public, making differences in
understanding and opinion visible or salient (Bromme 2000). We hypothesised that (1) the
higher the level of coercion, the more negotiation would occur. Likewise, we hypothesised
that (2) common ground would be highest in the Stringent version and lowest in the
Idiosyncratic version. Both hypotheses presume that more coercion will make participants
follow more closely an ideal model of negotiation, as laid down in the formalism. In the
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present study no measures for actual individual learning were made. We did not measure
task performance, either on the group level, or on the individual level.
Psychological safety was expected to be positively associated with negotiation and
common ground, but not to differ between low and high coercion versions of NTool. We
expected cognitive load differences due to increased negotiation (germane load) with the




Participants were 66 second year students (age 17.9 years, SD = 1.22) in senior secondary
vocational education from three different education programmes, High-tech Metal-Elec-




Participants were assigned the task of making a functional design of floating housing as a
solution for sea-level rise; a very important issue in the Netherlands. The task was designed
in collaboration with executives from the educational institution to ensure that the diffi-
culty level was appropriate for the level of expertise of the participants, and that the task
was interesting to all different educational programmes. The task was split in two parts. In
the first part (‘‘Floating Houses’’) the participants were to design a floating house. In the
second part (‘‘Amersfoort-by-the-Sea’’) additional information was given to keep the
participants going.
Ntool
Each team was supplied with three computers running NTool, one for each participant.
Two different collaboration scripts were used.
Idiosyncratic
This version used all primitives. On-screen information was presented about every con-
tribution, and whether it needed yet to be verified or decided upon (agreeing or dis-
agreeing; see Fig. 2 for an example of on-screen information for a contribution that needed
to be decided on). Furthermore, each participant was informed when he/she had not yet
verified all contributions, and when he/she had not yet decided on all contributions. Par-
ticipants were free to choose to what extent they verified and rejected, agreed, or disagreed
upon the contributions in the discussion. No coercive rules were used to require this. This
means, that if they wanted, participants could keep posting new contributions without ever
making a verification, they could completely refrain from using agreement, rejection and
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disagreement messages. This situation resembles giving a person a set of lines and symbols
to be used in constructing a diagram, but leaving it up to her/him to decide which symbols
and lines are used for what purpose, hence the name ‘‘Idiosyncratic’’.
Stringent
This version used the same primitives as the idiosyncratic version, but used coercion to
allow negotiation of only one contribution at one time. Furthermore, participants were not
allowed to compose reject-, agree-, and disagree-messages before the contribution had
been verified. While using the tool, options for message types that could not be used were
greyed out and made unavailable to the participants. For example, if a participant wanted
to send a disagreement message, but had not yet posted a verification, then the disagree-
ment option would be greyed out in the menu, and the participant would not be able to
choose it (see Fig. 3 for an example). Using prompts, participants were informed as to
whether they had to verify or decide on a contribution. This version was called the
‘‘Stringent’’ version because it applied strict rules for the situations in which each message
type could and could not be used.
Eleven groups used the Stringent formalism and eleven groups used the NTool Idio-
syncratically.
Fig. 2 The discussion window with one contribution selected. Information about the status of the
contribution is presented in the lower right-hand corner
Fig. 3 The message menu, with greyed-out options for verification, agreement, disagreement, and rejection
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Questionnaires
All questionnaires used in this study were adopted from other researchers who had been
able to use them reliably. The reliabilities reported here were computed using the data from
the current study. Group means of psychological safety (Cochran’s a = .69) were used as a
covariate, to control for differences in common ground and negotiation (Van den Bossche
et al. 2004). Social aspects of NTool were measured using scales (Kreijns 2004) for
sociability (a = .86) and social presence (a = .86). Cognitive load measurement was done
through self-report of invested mental effort on a one-item symmetrical scale ranging from
1 (very, very low mental effort) to 9 (very, very high mental effort) (Paas et al. 2003).
Mental effort refers to the cognitive capacity that is actually allocated to solve the problem
and can be considered to reflect the actual cognitive load (Sweller et al. 1998).
Procedure
Practice phase
The participants first received a tutorial that addressed the basics of NTool and then
proceeded to emphasise the rules of the formalism, and the way they constrained com-
munication. To ensure that participants were proficient with the NTool a practice case
(solving a road traffic safety problem) was used to enable them to gain experience with the
NTool. The practice phase took 75 min.
Experimental phase
The experimental phase was divided in two identical sessions, one in the morning and one
in the afternoon, with a 75-min lunch-break in between. After a 15-min coffee break,
participants started with the morning session with the experimental (sea-level rise) case. To
promote the construction of an individual problem representation, as well as to allow the
researchers to determine what this representation was, participants first had to carry out the
task individually (pre-test, 15 min). Participants could take notes while working individ-
ually on the task. Next, they solved the problem collaboratively (60 min), and after that
individually again (post-test, 15 min). All resulting individual problem representations and
solutions, as well as the group discussion were logged. In their post-test, participants were
also asked to state the points on which they felt that they had differences in opinion with
their team members, to account for agreeing to disagree. The afternoon session had the
exact same structure, but used a slightly different task called ‘‘Amersfoort-by-the-Sea’’.
This task built on the sea-level rise-case. No differences between morning and afternoon
session were expected due to time of day.




Negotiation was operationalised in two ways, namely the number of explicit negotiation
activities, and the amount of negotiation per conversation topic. A coding scheme for the
ICT-support for grounding in the classroom 547
123
coding of function and content of messages during collaboration was developed (cf. e.g.,
Avouris et al. 2003; Fischer et al. 2002; Mulder et al. 2002; Swaak et al. 1998; Thomas
et al. 1982). All messages were coded with regard to:
• Cognitive content—directly related to solving the problem.
• Regulative content—related to monitoring the problem-solving process and regulating
the collaboration process.
• Other content—not in any other category.
• Nonsense—uninterpretable messages.
Messages with cognitive content were specifically coded for function. The following
subcategories were used to code negotiation:
• Contribution: A new topic of conversation that has not been discussed before is
introduced.
• Verification: Information is directly or indirectly requested about the intended meaning
of a contribution or elaboration.
• Clarification: A reaction to a verification or a perceived lack of understanding, in which
the intended meaning of a contribution or elaboration is elucidated.
• Acceptance: A reaction to a contribution in which the contribution is judged intelligible
and/or correct.
• Rejection: A reaction to a contribution in which the contribution is judged
unintelligible and/or incorrect.
• Agreement: A reaction to a contribution in which the sender voices his/her agreement
with the contribution.
• Disagreement: A reaction to a contribution in which the sender voices his/her
disagreement with the contribution.
During the analysis it became apparent that some messages did not fit any of the above
subcategories, for example if people built on each other’s communications without
explicitly negotiating meaning of, or position on, a contribution. Such messages were
coded Elaboration when a contribution was elaborated upon by adding information or
summarising. Verification and clarification, in contrast to elaboration, were considered
indicative for explicit negotiation activities. The total number of contributions discussed
was used as an indicator for the range of topics discussed. Furthermore, messages with
regulative content that aimed at Monitoring the problem-solving-process were distin-
guished from those that were only used for Regulation of the conversation.
A research-assistant received 40 h of training on how to use the coding scheme.
Comparing three randomly selected experimental sessions coded by the first author and
the research-assistant resulted in a substantial (Landis and Koch 1977) inter-rater reli-
ability (Cohen’s kappa) of .73 (SE = .024). All data were further coded by the research-
assistant.
To measure the number of verifications and clarifications per conversation topic, epi-
sodes in the discussion that dealt with one conversation topic were first identified. The
contributions identified with the coding scheme for negotiation were considered the
starting points for a new discussion episode. An episode generally started with a contri-
bution and ended when one of the participants made a new contribution, and all of the
discussion in between these contributions dealt with one conversation topic. For each
group, negotiation per conversation topic was then calculated by dividing the sum of all
clarifications and verifications by the number of contributions.
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Common ground
Common ground was conceptualised as the degree of overlap in individual representations
after collaboration, in terms of contributions. For each of the episodes identified earlier, we
counted the number of individual representations they were present in. This was used as a
measure of spread for each episode. Common ground was then computed as the average
spread for all episodes in one group.
Cognitive load
Pre-tests were expected to be the same for both versions of NTool. Group tests were
expected to differ between conditions, with the Stringent version of NTool expected to
result in more cognitive load, due to an increase in germane load as a result of increased
grounding activities (germane load) or due to additional attention required by the NTool
formalism (extraneous load). In other words, extraneous effects cannot be ruled out if
cognitive load differences are found after the group task. Post-tests were also expected to
differ between conditions, with participants in the Stringent groups expected to report an
increase in cognitive load because of increased processing of knowledge acquired from the
other participants due to increased grounding activities (germane load).
Statistical analyses
Negotiation and common ground were analysed using repeated measures ANCOVA.
Psychological safety was included as a covariate. In the case of significant main effects
from condition, but non-significant main or interaction effects of psychological safety,
analysis was repeated without psychological safety. All analyses were performed with
SPSS version 11. Due to participant drop-out after the first experimental phase, the number
of groups used in the statistical analyses was lower than 22. Data for 9 groups in the
Idiosyncratic, and 5 in the Stringent conditions were eligible for statistical analysis. Sig-
nificant effects of phase I on phase II (effects of time) were not considered relevant to our
hypotheses, and are not reported here.
Cognitive load measurements were analysed using nested repeated measures ANOVA.
The first level consisted of cognitive load measurements after the pre-test, after collabo-
ration, and after the post-test. As these measurements were done repeatedly, once in the
morning and once in the afternoon, session was included as a second level in the analysis.
Since we assumed that there would be differences after collaboration and after the post-
test, but not after the pre-test, we expected to find an interaction between condition and
cognitive load. We expected possible main effects of condition on cognitive load after
collaboration and after the post-test.
Results
Negotiation and common ground
Repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between session time and
coercion on verification F(1, 11) = 8.12, P < .05, and also main effects of both psycho-
logical safety, F(1, 11) = 5.83, P < .05, and condition, F(1, 11) =5.61, P < .05, on
verification. In both sessions, Stringent teams made more verifications than Idiosyncratic
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teams. Inspection of Table 2 shows that this effect is significantly stronger in the morning
sessions than in the afternoon sessions. Main effects of psychological safety and coercion
on clarification also were observed, F(1, 11) = 6.67, P < .05 and F(1, 11) = 6.17, P < .05,
respectively. The Stringent groups had more clarifications than the Idiosyncratic groups,
and psychological safety positively affected both verification and clarification. Further-
more, there was a significant positive main effect of psychological safety on agreement,
F(1, 11) = 7.35, P < .05. A non-significant, but notable effect was found for coercion on
regulation, F(1, 11) = 4.56, P = .06, which is mentioned here because it may assist in
explaining the unexpected results. Regulation was highest in the Stringent groups. Finally,
there was a significant main effect of coercion on ‘other’ communication, F(1, 11) = 5.60,
P < .05; eliminating psychological safety from the model still resulted in a significant main
effect of coercion F(1, 12) = 6.05, P < .05, which means that ‘other’ communication
occurred most in the Stringent groups.
We found significant main effects of both psychological safety and coercion on
negotiation of meaning per contribution, F(1, 11) = 9.34, P < .05 and F(1, 11) = 8.17,
P < .05 respectively. Negotiation per contribution was highest in the Stringent groups, and
increased with psychological safety. Finally, there was a significant main effect of coercion
on common ground, F(1, 11) = 9.78, P < .01, but not in the expected direction. Eliminating
psychological safety from the model still resulted in a significant main effect of coercion
F(1, 12) = 8.46, P < .05. Common ground was highest in the Idiosyncratic groups.
Cognitive load
Nested repeated measures ANOVA (see Table 3) revealed a significant interaction of
session time, cognitive load, and coercion, F(1, 52) = 7.67, P < .01, and of cognitive load
Table 2 Negotiation and common ground
Condition
Idiosyncratic (n = 9) Stringent (n = 5)
Morning Afternoon Morning Afternoon
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Contribution 6.22 1.99 4.89 1.90 7.20 2.28 3.80 1.64
Verification 1.22 1.30 1.67 1.80 4.80 2.28 2.00 2.83
Clarification 1.89 1.97 .78 .67 3.60 1.67 2.40 3.21
Elaboration 27.44 16.36 27.11 14.43 46.00 23.05 20.40 18.15
Acceptance 1.56 1.13 1.33 1.32 2.00 1.58 2.60 2.41
Rejection .44 1.01 .00 .00 .80 1.10 .20 .45
Agreement 3.33 2.78 4.44 2.96 3.80 3.27 2.80 2.39
Disagreement .44 .73 .44 .73 1.40 .89 .80 .84
Regulation 24.44 17.51 22.78 19.85 43.00 20.24 44.13 16.36
Monitoring 2.78 3.35 2.22 2.33 3.88 2.80 2.00 1.85
Other 27.67 31.67 48.11 36.81 71.63 42.61 109.88 54.96
Nonsense 1.22 2.54 22.22 62.99 2.00 2.43 4.63 3.89
Negotiation per Contribution .52 .51 .54 .50 1.31 .86 1.03 .72
Common Ground 1.90 .65 2.02 .61 1.41 .39 1.55 .41
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and session, F(1, 52) = 4.54, P < .05, which shows that there were significant differences
between the three cognitive load measurements (pre-test, group work, post-test), and that
these differences were specific for session time (morning or afternoon) and coercion.
Figure 4 seems to indicate a difference between the afternoon session in the Stringent
groups and the other sessions. In the afternoon Stringent session, cognitive load on the
post-test is higher than cognitive load after the pre-test and after group collaboration,
whereas in the Stringent morning session and in both Idiosyncratic sessions it is lower.
Furthermore, cognitive load measurements in the Stringent morning session were higher
than cognitive load measurements from the other sessions. Finally, we found a marginally
significant main effect of coercion on cognitive load, F(1, 52) = 3.67, P = .06, suggesting
that cognitive load was highest in the Stringent groups.
Table 3 Cognitive load
Cognitive load measured after.... Condition
Idiosyncratic Stringent
M SD n M SD n
... the practice task 3.36 1.56 33 3.88 1.85 33
... the morning Pre-test 4.06 1.55 31 4.78 1.25 27
... the morning Group collaboration 4.35 1.64 31 4.74 1.29 27
... the morning Post-test 3.87 1.38 31 4.48 1.05 27
... the afternoon Pre-test 4.16 1.37 31 4.08 1.94 25
... the afternoon Group collaboration 4.26 1.24 31 4.24 1.48 25
... the afternoon Post-test 3.87 1.36 30 4.85 1.46 26






























Fig. 4 Cognitive Load Measurements
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Social aspects of NTool
No significant differences were found with respect to social aspects of NTool (see Table 4).
Discussion
This article reported on the relationship between negotiation, the negotiation formalism,
and coercion, with the ultimate goal being to design an ICT environment that facilitates
knowledge construction. The main goal was to design a formalism for the facilitation of
common ground, which is an important aspect of collaborative learning and appears to be a
prerequisite for knowledge construction.
The results showed that, as expected, the Stringent version of NTool increased nego-
tiation activities, both with regard to the number of verifications and clarifications, and the
amount of negotiation per contribution, although the effect of coercion on verification was
significantly stronger in the morning sessions than in the afternoon sessions. This means
that, as in our previous study with NTool, high coercion increases negotiation activities
during interaction. However, contrary to our expectations, and also to previous findings,
common ground was highest in the Idiosyncratic groups. It seems that high coercion did
have the expected influence on interaction, but that this change in interaction did not result
in associated effects on common ground.
Disruption of collaboration (Dillenbourg 2002), which can be caused by over-scripting
collaboration, may explain some of the results. Two unexpected differences that did not
occur in our previous study are quite telling in this respect. The first is the marginally
significant difference in regulation activities and the second is the difference in ‘other’
communication. Both figures were highest in the Stringent groups. The difference in
regulation might show that stringent use of NTool was quite taxing. The difference in
‘other’ communication may signal a lack of motivation for the task at hand, that may have
been a side-effect of the need for regulation.
The nature of the specific participant population may explain some of these results. In a
previous study of the influence of coercion on the effectiveness of NTool (Beers et al.
2005) senior college students did not show more regulation with high coercion. Secondary
vocational education institutes, however, generally draw a student population that is in
many respects different from senior university students. On average, the participants of the
current study were about 4 years younger, and therefore may have had less knowledge of
the domains they were to use in the task, and were less serious than the university students.
Also, they had little prior experience working in groups. Indeed, recent research suggests
that university-level students benefit more from tools that facilitate reflective thinking
Table 4 Social aspects of NTool
Condition
Idiosyncratic Stringent
M SD n M SD n
Sociability 3.29 .75 31 3.42 .60 26
Social presence 1.91 .88 30 2.28 .74 26
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(which NTool does), due to prior learning experience, than high-school learners, who still
need more general group support (Song et al. 2006). This may explain why the secondary
vocationally education participants needed to regulate more than the university seniors
studied by Beers et al. (2005). The high occurrence of ‘other’ communication with the
high-coercion NTool may in fact signal that the participants were distracted or frustrated.
Explanations involving cognitive overloading and a lack of social presence and sociability
of the Stringent NTool can both safely be ruled out. The cognitive load measurements do
not suggest increased cognitive load during group work, and no significant differences
were observed with regard to sociability and social presence.
The above explanation indicates a number of individual and task prerequisites that may
be needed for NTool to be effective. The target population may need some minimal level
of prior experience with collaborative work and with problem-solving before a very pro-
cess-specific support such as offered by NTool can be effective. In other words, the prior
experience of the current population with collaboration and problem-solving may have
proved too large a gap with the individual prerequisites required by successful use of
NTool. This would still demand explanation of the observed increase in negotiation
activities.
We did find a significant difference in cognitive load after the post-tests, which could
indicate increased processing of others’ knowledge. However, common ground being
highest in the Idiosyncratic groups may actually indicate that the participants from Idio-
syncratic groups may have performed processing during collaboration that participants
from the Stringent groups could not do before the post-tests. Overall, these results would
then indicate that NTool indeed affected negotiation as expected, but that this influence
was limited to surface aspects of interaction, and did not co-occur with increased pro-
cessing of other’s knowledge. As it is, they may reflect the fact that NTool only influenced
the communication at the surface level in the present study. That is, NTool tells the learner
what a verification is, and the learner makes one, and we assume that this activity will have
a cognitive substrate in the guise of actively reflecting on others’ contributions and one’s
own perspective. Instead the cognitive substrate of making a verification message may
have been the act of making a message comply with the given description of what such a
message looks like. In other words, the participants may have been busy wording their
messages as verifications and clarifications, instead of being busy actually verifying their
understanding, and clarifying their intentions.
The above also has some implications for the use of coercion. If some type of learning
support, a formalism, supports or facilitates task aspects that require unmet individual
prerequisites on the part of the learners, then such a formalism may not have the ability to
have any beneficial effects on the learning process. In that case it would not matter, from
the perspective of the learning outcome, to use coercion or not, because the coercion only
applies the formalism with more strength, it does not make understanding it easier or
harder. From a disruption of communication perspective, however, it may actually be
detrimental. In sum, when learners have too little prior experience to benefit from the use
of a formalism, coercing such a formalism may be detrimental to the learning process. In
terms of cognitive load, such coercion would be entirely extraneous to the task.
With regard to psychological safety, our results are similar to the results of other
researchers (Chang and Lee 2001; Edmondson 1999; Van den Bossche et al. 2004), but
different in that ours were obtained in an ICT-environment instead of face-to-face.
Psychological safety positively affected both verification and clarification, as well as
negotiation per contribution. This means that a sense of being safe within a team affects
the extent to which people explicitly verify their understanding. Possibly, making a
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verification is a form of risk-taking because the one doing it feels s/he reveals a lack of
knowledge or understanding. Making a verification thus can constitute taking a personal
risk.
The results are promising with regard to the facilitation of the grounding process, but
they also indicate limitations in the applicability of such facilitation. In her study, Barron
(2003) showed that interaction is important for problem-solving, and that engaging in each
other’s thinking was related to better solutions. The present study has shown that ICT-tools
can be used to facilitate such interactions, by using a formalism for negotiation, and
coercing the user into following it. Furthermore, it was shown that NTool can be adapted
for different populations, ranging from students of secondary vocational education to
senior level college students. However, the laboratory results obtained by Beers et al.
(2005) were more promising than the current results. The ultimate implementation of a tool
like NTool should therefore carefully be weighed against the expected benefits, and the
capacities of the intended audience. More research is needed to obtain guidelines for
‘tweaking’ NTool so that it is better adapted to secondary vocationally education.
More research is required to test our ultimate aim of facilitating collaborative learning
and complex problem-solving. The present study does argue a relation between common
ground and the quality of problem solutions, but does not explicitly measure it. With regard
to support of learning processes, the current results do not offer sufficient proof that NTool
indeed influenced learning as intended, nor did the study include measurements of learning
performance. However, this is also due to the fact that the grounding framework was
mainly used as a prescriptive theory for the design of NTool, not as a theory to be tested.
To indeed test the relation between grounding and learning, and the ways the two might be
mutually reconceptualised, would require either extensive exploratory study of grounding
and learning processes in collaborative learning groups, or conceptual comparisons of
theories of collaborative learning and grounding.
It would seem that NTool, when used to teach about grounding and collaboration, ought
to be used with groups that have more experience in working together and solving prob-
lems. Overall, it can be concluded that NTool and its underlying framework affect
negotiation of common ground, and that adding some coercion increases this effect.
However, one should be careful with the specific task and audience before implementing
NTool, because otherwise the effects may be limited to surface aspects of communication.
Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Wim van der Vegt for his excellent job programming
NTool, and Aukje Schurer for her assistance during the study. Last but not least we thank Rob Sars, Rene
van der Meent, Bert van Dinter, Ge´rard Opstelten, Yvonne Moerman, and especially Nico Stunnenberg from
the Koning Willem I College for their help and enthusiasm with the study. This research was supported and
made possible by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) within the stimulation
program Society and the Electronic Superhighway under grant number 014-43-704.
References
Alpay, L., Giboin, A., & Dieng, R. (1998). Accidentology: An example of problem solving by multiple
agents with multiple representations. In M. W. Van Someren, P. Reimann, H. P. A. Boshuizen, & T. De
Jong (Eds.), Learning with multiple representations (pp. 152–174). Oxford, UK: Elsevier.
Avouris, N. M., Dimitracopoulou, A., & Komis, V. (2003). On analysis of collaborative problem solving:
An object-oriented approach. Computers in Human Behavior, 19(2), 147–167.
Baker, M. J., Hansen, T., Joiner, R., & Traum, D. (1999). The role of grounding in collaborative learning
tasks. In P. Dillenbourg (Ed.), Collaborative learning: Cognitive and computational approaches (pp.
31–63). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Pergamon/Elsevier Science.
554 P. J. Beers et al.
123
Baker, M. J., & Lund, K. (1997). Promoting reflective interactions in a computer-supported collaborative
learning environment. Journal of Computer Assisted Learning, 13, 175–193.
Barron, B. (2003). When smart groups fail. The Journal of the Learning Sciences, 12(3), 307–359.
Barrows, H. S., & Tamblyn, R. M. (1980). Problem-based learning. An approach to medical education.
New York, USA: Springer.
Beers, P. J., Boshuizen, H. P. A., Kirschner, P. A., & Gijselaers, W. H. (2005). Computer support for
knowledge construction in collaborative learning environments. Computers in Human Behavior, 21(4),
623–643.
Boshuizen, H. P. A., & Tabachneck-Schijf, H. J. M. (1998). Problem solving with multiple representations
by multiple and single agents: An analysis of the issues involved. In M. W. Van Someren, P. Reimann,
H. P. A. Boshuizen, & T. De Jong (Eds.), Learning with multiple representations (pp. 137–151).
Oxford, UK: Elsevier.
Bromme, R. (2000). Beyond one’s own perspective: The psychology of cognitive interdisciplinarity. In P.
Weingart, & N. Stehr (Eds.), Practicing interdisciplinarity (pp. 115–133). Toronto, Canada: University
of Toronto Press.
Bromme, R., Rambow, R., & Nu¨ckles, M. (2001). Expertise and estimating what other people know: The
influence of professional experience and type of knowledge. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Applied, 7(4), 317–330.
Buckingham Shum, S. J., MacLean, A., Bellotti, V. M. E., & Hammond, N. V. (1997). Graphical argu-
mentation and design cognition. Human-Computer Interaction, 12, 267–300.
Chang, H.-T., & Lee, A. T. (2001). The relationship between psychological safety, organisation context
support and team learning behaviour in taiwan. Global Journal of Engineering Education, 5(2), 185–
192.
Clark, H. H., & Brennan, S. E. (1991). Grounding in communication. In L. B. Resnick, J. M. Levine, & S. D.
Teasley (Eds.), Perspectives on socially shared cognition (pp. 127–149). Washington DC, USA:
American Psychological Association.
Clark, H. H., & Schaefer, E. F. (1989). Contributing to discourse. Cognitive Science, 13, 259–294.
Cohen, E. G. (1994). Restructuring the classroom: Conditions for productive small grousps. Review of
Educational Research, 64(1), 1–35.
Dillenbourg, P. (2002). Over-scripting cscl: The risks of blending collaborative learning with instructional
design. In P. A. Kirschner (Ed.), Three worlds of cscl: Can we support cscl? (pp. 61–91). Heerlen, The
Netherlands: Open Universiteit Nederland.
Edmondson, A. (1999). Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 44, 350–383.
Fischer, F., Bruhn, J., Gra¨sel, C., & Mandl, H. (2002). Fostering collaborative knowledge construction with
visualization tools. Learning and Instruction, 12, 213–232.
Fischer, F., & Mandl, H. (2005). Knowledge convergence in computer-supported collaborative learning:
The role of external representations. The Journal of the Learning Sciences, 14(3), 405–441.
Fischer, G., Nakakoji, K., & Ostwald, J. (1995). Supporting the evolution of design artifacts with repre-
sentation of context and intent. In G. M. Olson & S. Schuon (Eds.), Proceedings of the symposium on
designing interactive systems: Processes, practices, methods and techniques (DIS ‘95) (pp. 7–15), Ann
Arbor, MI, USA, August 23–25, 1995. New York: ACM Press.
Garrison, D. R., Anderson, T., & Archer, W. (2000). Critical inquiry in a text-based environment: Computer
conferencing in higher education. The Internet and Higher Education, 2(2–3), 87–105.
Jonassen, D. H. (2000). Computers as mindtools for schools: Engaging critical thinking. Columbus, US:
Prentice-Hall.
Kreijns, K. (2004). Sociable cscl environments: Social affordances, sociability, and social presence. Doc-
toral dissertation, Open University of the Netherlands, Heerlen, the Netherlands.
Kreijns, K., Kirschner, P. A., & Jochems, W. (2002). The sociability of computer-supported collaborative
learning environments. Educational Technology & Society, 5(1), 8–22.
Landis, J., & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for categorical data. Biometrics,
33, 159–174.
Lo¨hner, S., Van Joolingen, W., & Savelsbergh, E. R. (2003). The effect of external representation on
constructing computer models of complex phenomena. Instructional Science, 31, 395–418.
Mulder, I., Swaak, J., & Kessels, J. (2002). Assessing group learning and shared understanding in tech-
nology-mediated interaction. Educational Technology & Society, 5(1), 35–47.
Norman, D. A. (1993). Things that make us smart: Defending human attributes in the age of the machine.
Cambridge, US: Perseus Publishing.
Paas, F., Renkl, A., & Sweller, J. (2004). Cognitive load theory: Instructional implications of the interaction
between information structures and cognitive architecture. Instructional Science, 32(1), 1–8.
ICT-support for grounding in the classroom 555
123
Paas, F., Tuovinen, J. E., Tabbers, H., & Van Gerven, P. W. M. (2003). Cognitive load measurement as a
means to advance cognitive load theory. Educational Psychologist, 38(1), 63–71.
Rourke, L., Anderson, T., Garrison, R., & Archer, W. (1999). Assessing social presence in asynchronous
text-based computer conferencing. Journal of Distance Education, 14(2), 50–71.
Song, H.-D., Grabowski, B. L., Koszalka, T. A., & Harkness, W. L. (2006). Patterns of instructional-design
factors prompting reflective thinking in middle-school and college level problem-based learning
environments. Instructional Science, 34, 63–87.
Suthers, D. D. (2001). Towards a systematic study of representational guidance for collaborative learning
discourse. Journal of Universal Computer Science, 7, 254–277.
Swaak, J., Van Joolingen, W. R., & De Jong, T. (1998). Supporting simulation-based learning; the effects of
model progression and assignments on definitional and intuitive knowledge. Learning and Instruction,
8(3), 235–252.
Sweller, J., Van Merrie¨nboer, J. J. G., & Paas, F. G. W. C. (1998). Cognitive architecture and instructional
design. Educational Psychology Review, 10(3), 251–295.
Thomas, A. P., Bull, P., & Roger, D. (1982). Conversational exchange analysis. Journal of Language and
Social Psychology, 1(2), 141–155.
Van Bruggen, J. M., Kirschner, P. A., & Jochems, W. (2002). External representation of argumentation in
cscl and the management of cognitive load. Learning and Instruction, 12, 121–138.
Van Bruggen, J. M. (2003). Explorations in graphical argumentation; the use of external representations in
collaborative problem solving. Unpublished PhD-thesis, Open University of the Netherlands, Heerlen,
The Netherlands.
Van den Bossche, P., Gijselaers, W., & Segers, M. (2004, April). Effects of social factors on shared
cognition and teamwork in collaborative learning environments. Paper presented at the AERA, San
Diego, USA.
Weinberger, A., Ertl, B., Fischer, F., & Mandl, H. (2005). Epistemic and social scripts in computer-
supported collaborative learning. Instructional Science, 33, 1–30.
556 P. J. Beers et al.
123
